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When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006
to hear challenges to two voluntary desegregation plans in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,' civil
rights activists watched with a mix of anticipation and trepidation. Some
hoped that the litigation would offer a way to expand race-conscious
policies in elementary and secondary education. Others feared that the
cases would serve as the occasion to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, a
2003 decision that upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action in
admissions at the University of Michigan's law school.' In Grutter, Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor endorsed diversity as a compelling interest
but made clear that it was not a carte blanche for race-based decision-
making.' Relying on a tradition of academic freedom, she recognized
that a diverse student body promoted the free exchange of ideas by
including a range of perspectives and experiences. Moreover, diversity
advanced democratic legitimacy by opening pathways to leadership for
individuals from many walks of life.4 These goals justified the use of
race as one factor in the holistic review of applicants, but race could not
be weighed so heavily that, in effect, quotas were created.5
After Grutter, civil rights advocates immediately began to specu-
late that the diversity rationale, reinvigorated after the Michigan victory,
could validate voluntary desegregation plans in elementary and secon-
dary schools.6 This strategy seemed vital to preserving some degree of
t Robert D. and Leslie-Kay Raven Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School, and Founding
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1. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007).
2. 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
3. Id. at 328-33.
4. Id. at 330-32.
5. Id. at 334-39.
6. See, e.g., Caroline Hendrie, In U.S. Schools, Race Still Counts, EDUC. WK., Jan. 21, 2004,
at 1. Indeed, this strategy led to an important early success in the en banc decision of Comfort v.
Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). See John Gehring & Caroline Hendrie,
Advocates Hail Ruling Backing Desegregation Plan, EDUC. WK., July 13, 2005, at 3.
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integration in public education because, with court-ordered remedies
drawing to a close, many schools once again were becoming racially
identifiable.7 Efforts to rely on race-neutral alternatives, like socioeco-
nomic integration, were not uniformly successful in countering these
segregative trends.8 Despite a sense of urgency in the civil rights com-
munity, a victory before the Court was by no means guaranteed. Justice
O'Connor, the principal architect of the Grutter decision, had recently
retired, and the time seemed ripe to revisit her reasoning about
diversity.9
In fact, the question presented for review in Parents Involved was
whether Grutter could be used to uphold voluntary plans that relied on
race-conscious student assignments to achieve desegregation. 10 Despite
every indication that the voluntary desegregation cases would be a refer-
endum on Grutter, none of the Justices addressed the diversity rationale
in depth. The Parents Involved litigation produced shifting majorities for
key constitutional principles: one five-person majority for the proposi-
tion that strict scrutiny should apply to voluntary desegregation plans;
one for the assertion that promoting diversity and preventing racial isola-
tion are compelling interests that can justify such plans; and one for the
view that the plans were not narrowly tailored to promote these interests.
Amid this fragmentation, any careful analysis of how a diversity ratio-
nale could be transplanted from colleges and universities to elementary
and secondary schools was lost.
Applying strict scrutiny, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the
desegregation plans as inconsistent with a colorblind Constitution.1" His
opinion dealt with Grutter by treating its color-conscious approach as
peculiar to higher education.' 2 Writing for the dissent, Justice Stephen
7. See Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and Unequal
Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 53, 53-55, 61-63 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).
Some schools have experimented with socioeconomic integration as an alternative to race-based
plans. So far, the results in producing diversity are mixed and depend on the demographic make-
up of each school district. See Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 38. Despite these challenges, in the wake of Parents Involved decision,
Louisville, Kentucky began to develop such a plan. Id.
8. See Sean F. Reardon et al., Implications of Income-Based School Assignment Policies for
Racial School Segregation, 28 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 49, 67 (2006).
9. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 20-25 (2007).
10. Petitioner's Brief at i, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908); Brief of Petitioner at i, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-
915); Brief for Respondents at i, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908); Brief for
Respondents at 21, 24-27, 29-30, 36-44, 49, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-915); see
also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 325 (2007)
(discussing Louisville schools).
11. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 2754 (majority opinion); see also Peter Schmidt, High Court Leaves Michigan Case
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Breyer supported the voluntary desegregation plans and undoubtedly
was sympathetic to diversity. Even so, his opinion focused primarily on
Brown v. Board of Education's legacy as a desegregation mandate.
13
The crucial swing vote, Justice Anthony Kennedy, endorsed diversity
but ultimately cast doubt on the constitutional viability of any race-con-
scious student assignment plan. 4 Kennedy had been skeptical of holistic
review in the University of Michigan Law School case, and his decision
in Parents Involved made plain his distaste for governmental policies
that classify individuals on the basis of race.' 5 With such divergent hold-
ings, even the five Justices who recognized diversity as compelling did
not give significant consideration to its unique import for the elementary
and secondary school setting.
In short, a case that began as a referendum on Grutter generally
failed to address its full implications outside of higher education.
Although Parents Involved was groundbreaking because it expanded the
diversity rationale to elementary and secondary schools, even the Jus-
tices who endorsed voluntary desegregation did not fully capitalize on
this unprecedented success. Instead, they mostly treated diversity and
desegregation as a distinction without a difference. A careful compari-
son of the jurisprudential roots of these two bodies of law shows why
they should not be conflated. There were real costs to the failure to dis-
entangle the rationales. As I will show, a majority of the Justices were so
concerned with limiting remedies for past discrimination that they
largely overlooked the problem of constraining a community's capacity
to imagine its racial future.
I. A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE: DIVERSITY AND
DESEGREGATION IN PARENTS INVOLVED
Parents Involved addressed the constitutionality of voluntary
desegregation plans in Louisville, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington.
Louisville adopted its plan when a federal district court terminated a
Intact, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 6, 2007, at Al ("[T]he court's majority suggested that the key
justification Michigan offered in defending its policies . . . did not hold as much weight in the
context of elementary- and secondary-school education.").
13. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Grutter said
that context matters and here the context turned on a history that "has required special
administrative remedies").
14. See id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system of individual
racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes accordingly.").
15. See id.; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
16. Jonathan Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies To
Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 491, 491 (2008).
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desegregation order after the school system had complied in good faith
with remedies to eliminate the vestiges of past intentional discrimina-
tion. To preserve gains in integration made under the court's supervi-
sion, Louisville's voluntary plan required all non-magnet schools in the
district to maintain a black enrollment of between fifteen and fifty per-
cent. New students could apply for admission to their first and second
choice of schools within designated clusters. Those who did not apply
were simply assigned to a school. 7 After receiving an assignment, a
student could request a transfer to another non-magnet school. These
transfers would be denied if there were no available spaces or the trans-
fers placed the school outside the guidelines for racial balance. 8 Crystal
Meredith brought suit when her son's application to transfer to kinder-
garten in a school closer to home was denied. Although space was avail-
able, the transfer would have had "an adverse effect on desegregation
compliance. '" 9
Seattle had not been subject to court-ordered desegregation,
although the district did face the threat of litigation. 0 Seattle experi-
mented with a number of voluntary plans, which, over time, reduced the
district's reliance on race in making student assignments. In 1978,
school officials implemented a busing program. By 1988, however, they
had responded to the problem of white flight by instituting a student
choice plan.21 In 1999, the district revised its approach yet again, this
time to ensure that students received their first or second choice of high
school. Seattle allowed ninth-graders to choose among schools by rank-
ing them in order of preference. If too many students listed a school as
their first choice, the district applied three tie-breaking criteria to allot
the available seats. The first criterion looked at whether the applicant
had a sibling attending the school; the second examined the impact on
the balance of white and nonwhite pupils at the school; and the third
evaluated geographic proximity to the school.22 With respect to the
racial tiebreaker, a student's request to transfer would be denied if the
school deviated more than ten percent from the overall white enrollment
of about forty-one percent in the district.23 Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools, a non-profit organization composed of parents whose chil-
dren had been or might be denied admittance to their preferred high
17. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
18. Id. at 2750.
19. Id. There was some doubt as to whether the voluntary desegregation guidelines even
applied to kindergarten applications. Id. at 2750 n.8.
20. Id. at 2747; id. at 2803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2747 (majority opinion); id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2747 (majority opinion). For the 2001-2002 school year, the permitted deviation
from the target racial composition was increased to fifteen percent. Id. at 2747 n.3.
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LET FREEDOM RING
schools, brought suit alleging that the use of a racial tiebreaker violated
equal protection. 4
The two plans differed in their mechanics but offered similar justi-
fications for considering race in pupil assignments. Neither district could
invoke a remedial rationale based on a court's finding of past discrimi-
nation. As a legal matter, Louisville had cured prior violations when it
was declared unitary; Seattle never had been found guilty of intentional
wrongdoing. 25 Given that a remedial justification was unavailable,
diversity seemed to be the most promising basis for defending the plans.
Both Louisville and Seattle capitalized on the Grutter decision by citing
the importance of a diverse student body to the learning process in ele-
mentary and secondary schools. This interest in diversity was coupled
with an independent purpose of reducing racial isolation.26
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected any expan-
sion of the diversity rationale, noting that Grutter had adopted a norm of
deference based on a tradition of academic freedom unique to colleges
and universities.27 This stance was hardly surprising. None of the Jus-
tices who joined Roberts's opinion had evinced any real sympathy for
diversity or affirmative action. Two of them, Antonin Scalia and Clar-
ence Thomas, had dissented in the Michigan law school case,2 8 and two
others, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, had been
appointed to the Court based on their conservative credentials and pre-
sumptive commitment to colorblindness.2 9 All four seemed strongly
inclined to interpret the Constitution as forbidding official racial classifi-
cations except when necessary to remedy past discrimination.
What is perhaps more surprising is that the plurality allowed Grut-
ter to survive in higher education without much in the way of a chal-
lenge to its reasoning. Roberts's opinion struck a compromise that left
the diversity rationale intact in higher education, but seemingly irrele-
vant everywhere else. He carefully limited the Michigan decision to its
facts by noting the Court's reliance on the history of "expansive free-
doms of speech and thought associated with the university environ-
24. Id. at 2748.
25. Id. at 2752.
26. Id. at 2758-59 (plurality opinion). Although Seattle also justified its plan as a way "to
make sure that racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non-white students from
having equitable access to the most popular over-subscribed schools," id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), the Court focused on the goals of promoting
diversity and reducing racial isolation.
27. Id. at 2753-54 (majority opinion).
28. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-47 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. See GREENBURO, supra note 9, at 228-31, 305-07.
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ment."3° This tradition of academic freedom in turn created "a special
niche in our constitutional tradition" 3' for institutions of higher educa-
tion. Roberts chided the school districts for invoking Grutter without
displaying any real sensitivity to the particulars of the Michigan case,
which involved efforts to foster "a specific type of broad-based diversity
and ... the unique context of higher education."3 This "broader effort
to achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and view-
points"' 33 stood in marked contrast to voluntary desegregation plans that
focused almost entirely on race. 34 As a result, Roberts concluded that the
Louisville and Seattle cases were not governed by Grutter.35
Roberts drew a sharp distinction between promoting diversity and
the school districts' other stated goal of preventing racial isolation. He
pointed out that Louisville and Seattle measured success in eliminating
racially identifiable schools "solely by reference to the demographics of
the respective school districts," a practice that was tantamount to "racial
balancing. '36 Because the districts' guidelines were so closely tied to the
racial make-up of schools, Roberts feared that upholding the plans
would set a precedent with "no logical stopping point."37 Indeed, his
plurality opinion warned:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would jus-
tify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American
society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command
that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." 38
Even if Grutter's recognition of diversity in higher education remained
valid, Roberts noted, it could not justify a "patently unconstitutional"
racial quota system.39
Justice Thomas joined the plurality in rejecting diversity as a com-
pelling interest in elementary and secondary education, and he went to
some lengths to explain why in a separate opinion. Because Thomas
generally equated diversity with desegregation, he saw Parents Involved
as a referendum not on Grutter but on the hoped-for gains associated
30. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
31. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
34. See id. at 2753-54.
35. Id. at 2754.
36. Id. at 2757 (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 2758 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).




with integration. His opinion recounted a longstanding debate over the
success of integrated classrooms in promoting measurable gains in
minority student achievement.4 ° Thomas pointed out that social science
evidence was mixed and could not support the adoption of voluntary
desegregation plans.4" Nor was Thomas impressed by attempts to invoke
the intangible benefits of creating classroom environments reflective of
a pluralistic society. Thomas dismissed justifications rooted in inclusive-
ness and democratic legitimacy as "just another way to say racial
balancing.
4 2
For Thomas, amorphous and unsupported rationales could not dis-
lodge the primacy of a colorblind Constitution. In his view, color-con-
scious remedies were appropriate only to remedy de jure segregation due
to past governmental wrongdoing. Neither courts nor school districts
were empowered to rely on race-based classifications to counter de facto
segregation that resulted from neighborhood housing patterns.43 Given
the firm constitutional guarantee that governmental actors not treat indi-
viduals differently on the basis of race, Thomas saw no reason to defer
to local officials' judgments about the desirability of voluntary desegre-
gation plans.'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer invoked diversity
but emphasized desegregation. In his view, the Court's recognition of
diversity as a compelling interest in Grutter necessarily extended to pri-
mary and secondary schools, "where the education of this Nation's chil-
dren begins."45 Even so, he made desegregation jurisprudence the core
of his analysis, explaining that "it was Brown, after all, focusing upon
primary and secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, focusing on law
schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Ed[ucation], focusing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not
only Americans but the world."
'46
Reflecting his preoccupation with Brown's legacy, Breyer equated
the case for diversity in elementary and secondary schools with available
evidence on the benefits of integration, much as Justice Thomas had.
Breyer too concluded that the findings were mixed; however, he did not
believe that this inconclusive record was fatal to the school districts'
plans 7.4 Acknowledging the inherent limitations of empirical evidence,
40. See id. at 2776-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2778.
42. Id. at 2779.
43. Id. at 2768-70.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. See id. at 2820-21.
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Breyer argued that social science research could never be the basis for
recognizing any compelling interest if perfect certainty were required.48
Under these circumstances, Breyer believed that local school boards
should be given the leeway to decide how to proceed in the face of
conflicting expert opinions.49
To support his deferential stance, Breyer cited desegregation prece-
dents, insisting that they did not draw any bright-line distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation so far as local boards were
concerned. In his view, federal courts were confined to addressing de
jure segregation, but a similar constraint should not apply to school offi-
cials. As his dissenting opinion explained, "A longstanding and unbro-
ken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause
permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve pos-
itive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel
it."50 Citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,5" the
Court's most comprehensive statement on how to craft school desegre-
gation decrees, Breyer insisted that the Court had recognized and
encouraged voluntary efforts like those in Louisville and Seattle as a
way to realize Brown's promise of equality.52
Like the dissenters, Justice Anthony Kennedy recognized diversity
as a compelling interest." He observed that "[t]he Nation's schools
strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races,
creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all."54
Acknowledging that the term "diversity" was used in multiple ways,
Kennedy noted that its legitimacy as a constitutional justification
"depend[ed] on its meaning and definition. 5 Kennedy took both Louis-
ville and Seattle to task for their imprecision in defining a diverse stu-
dent body, which in turn led to confusing and inconsistent
implementation of their voluntary desegregation plans. 56 Although Ken-
nedy agreed that diversity was compelling, he criticized the dissent for
citing Grutter but then invoking Brown's legacy to evade the stringent
limits on using race to achieve diversity. Kennedy believed that, in the
past, the Court had been extremely careful to avoid undue reliance on
race, beginning with its rejection of quotas in Regents of the University
48. Id. at 2821-22.
49. Id. at 2819, 2826, 2835-36.
50. Id. at 2811.
51. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
52. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811-12, 2814 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54. Id. at 2788.
55. Id. at 2789.
56. Id. at 2789-91.
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of California v. Bakke57 and culminating with its cautious endorsement
of holistic review in Grutter.58
Because of Kennedy's belief that governmental reliance on race
must be minimized, he rejected the Louisville and Seattle plans. He
found that race-based student assignments unduly constricted a child's
ability to "find his own identity" or "define her own persona."59 In Ken-
nedy's view, Bakke and Grutter recognized race as one element of a
person's background and experience, but were careful to avoid reifying
an individual's identity in racial terms. In addressing the proper role of
race in voluntary plans, Kennedy did not distinguish between promoting
diversity and preventing racial isolation. Indeed, he largely equated
these interests when he wrote that:
A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest
that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to
pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to
achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of
that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and
needs, should also be considered. 60
As a result, Justice Kennedy did not explain how voluntary desegrega-
tion plans could adopt a nuanced approach to a wide range of individual
traits while simultaneously pursuing a singular commitment to reducing
racial concentration.
In Parents Involved, none of the opinions fully engaged the distinc-
tion between diversity and desegregation. The majority limited Grutter's
reasoning to the realm of higher education without explaining in any
detail why a tradition of academic freedom had no relevance to elemen-
tary and secondary schools. The dissent acknowledged diversity as a
compelling interest but ultimately treated the desegregation precedents
as sufficient to uphold the Louisville and Seattle plans. Justice Kennedy,
the crucial swing vote, endorsed the importance of diversity in elemen-
tary and secondary education, but failed to consider how identity-build-
ing goals might be affected by the challenges of combating longstanding
patterns of public school segregation.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE DOCTRINES: A BRIEF JURISPRUDENTIAL
HISTORY OF DIVERSITY AND DESEGREGATION
Although the Justices in Parents Involved largely ignored the dis-
57. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
58. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. at 2797.
60. Id.
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tinction between diversity and desegregation, these two rationales impli-
cate different lines of authority: the school integration cases that grew
out of the Court's historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education6
and the higher education decisions that originated with Bakke. After
Brown, the Justices grappled with the meaning of equal protection and
discrimination, eventually becoming mired in a polemical debate about
whether or not the Constitution is colorblind. Concerns about the proper
scope of race-conscious remedies threatened to paralyze the Court when
it evaluated the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher educa-
tion. Diversity promised a way out of this deadlock by applying a differ-
ent logic rooted in the First Amendment. The brief jurisprudential
history set forth here will explore how these two lines of precedent
developed and diverged before they became conflated in Parents
Involved.
The Court's landmark decision in Brown actually grew out of cases
involving higher education. From the late 1930s to 1950, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People waged a campaign
against policies that excluded blacks from access to colleges and univer-
sities." The Court rejected state practices that barred black applicants
from admission and redirected them to schools in neighboring states.63
Nor could a public system of black colleges and universities justify bar-
riers to entry at predominantly white institutions.64 Once blacks were
admitted to historically white colleges and universities, access had to be
granted on equal terms. There could be no forced segregation in class-
rooms, dining halls, or libraries.15 In reaching these conclusions, the Jus-
tices found that separate could never be equal in higher education
because resources, both tangible and intangible, could not be rendered
equivalent.
In Brown, the Court struck down laws mandating segregation in
public elementary and secondary schools, declaring that "[s]eparate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal."66 Intangible harms would per-
sist, even if tangible resources, like investments in teachers, books, and
facilities were equalized. At the outset, the Court focused on the South,
where school systems had mandated segregation by law. There, the inju-
rious consequences to children flowed directly from the deliberate acts
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 251-55, 266, 323-57 (1975).
63. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 348-52 (1938).
64. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948).
65. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640 (1950).
66. 347 U.S. at 495.
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of state officials. Many observers nevertheless believed that the
landmark decision condemned all forms of segregation, whether offi-
cially compelled or not, because of the inherently pernicious effects on
children's "hearts and minds."67 The Court would not resolve the ques-
tion of whether Brown reached de facto segregation that occurred in the
absence of state action for two decades because of significant delays in
implementing the decision.
Even with stark evidence of official discrimination and Brown's
unanimous pronouncement, the Justices struggled to make their sweep-
ing mandate a reality. One year later, in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II), the Court ducked the question of relief by adopting a
formula of "all deliberate speed"68 that left to federal district courts the
daunting task of crafting appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis.
There was far more deliberation than speed in the years immediately
following Brown, but the Court affected a studied silence on the ade-
quacy of progress in achieving integration.69 After Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,7o the Justices felt emboldened to enforce
Brown's mandate. The Court rejected "freedom of choice" plans that
formally eliminated barriers to integration but did little to end persistent
patterns of racial isolation.7 Later, the Court provided remedial guide-
lines for desegregation cases and even unanimously endorsed busing,
despite the controversy it had engendered nationwide.72
As civil rights advocates targeted the North and West, the Justices'
resolve was tested. In these regions, official policies typically did not
mandate separate schools. So, there was no glaring history of slavery
and Jim Crow segregation to justify aggressive federal court interven-
tion. Nonetheless, pervasive patterns of residential segregation made
racially identifiable neighborhood schools a commonplace occurrence.73
The looming question, then, was whether equal protection required rem-
edies for not only de jure but also de facto segregation. Civil rights
advocates argued that Brown stood for the proposition that racial con-
centration was inherently harmful, regardless of its causes. Conserva-
tives who feared an activist judiciary insisted that only officially
67. Id. at 494.
68. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
69. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 321 (2004).
70. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1983, 2000a-2000cc (2000)).
71. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
72. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
73. See Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra
note 7, at 1, 10-11.
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mandated segregation rose to the level of a constitutional violation. 4
The Justices managed to sidestep this issue in 1973 when they
decided Keyes v. School District No. 1.75 The Court concluded that the
school board in Denver, Colorado had deliberately promoted separate
schools when it gerrymandered attendance zone boundaries, selected the
site for a new elementary school, and deployed mobile classroom units
to alleviate school overcrowding.76 Based on these findings, the Court
remanded with instructions to the trial judge to determine whether these
school policies and practices "were ... factors in causing the existing
condition of segregation."77 For the first time, though, the Justices could
not preserve the vaunted unanimity that had characterized Brown and the
desegregation decisions that followed. Members of the Court disagreed
openly about the appropriate scope of relief.78 Justice Lewis Powell filed
a partial concurrence in which he questioned the de jure/de facto distinc-
tion, 9 while Justice William Rehnquist became the first member of the
Court to dissent vigorously in a case promoting public school
integration.80
In Milliken v. Bradley,8 these divisions persisted and led civil
rights attorneys to suffer their first high-profile defeat in a school deseg-
regation case after Brown. A federal district court in Detroit had ordered
a mandatory busing plan that enlisted white students in nearby suburban
districts to desegregate heavily nonwhite central city schools. Five Jus-
tices overturned the order, finding that inter-district remedies were
appropriate only when neighboring school systems had contributed to
the de jure segregation that triggered judicial intervention. 82 In exempt-
ing suburban districts from court-ordered busing, the Court emphasized
74. See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 291, 293.
75. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
76. Id. at 191-92, 198-200. The Court also mentioned that faculty and staff were assigned to
schools on the basis of race. Id. at 199-200.
77. Id. at 214.
78. Until the Keyes decision, the Justices had compromised to ensure unanimous opinions that
reinforced the incontrovertible imperative of desegregation. In Swann, for instance, the Court
struggled mightily to present a united front when establishing desegregation guidelines to preserve
Brown's legacy. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY 111-84 (1986).
79. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218-20 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Powell
later retreated from this position, attributing it to his "Confederate emotion" over the unequal
treatment of the South as compared to the rest of the country. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 298-300, 306 (1994).
80. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 254; Orfield, supra note 73, at 10.
81. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Later, the Court relied on compensatory programs to cure the
history of discrimination in Detroit because meaningful desegregation was impossible without the
cooperation of white students in suburban school systems. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),
433 U.S. 267, 279-89 (1977).
82. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-52.
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not only their innocence but also their autonomy under a system of local
control of the schools.83 The Justices made clear that de jure segregation
in Detroit could not justify remedies for de facto segregation in the sub-
urbs. The patterns of segregation at issue in the case were fairly typical
of those in other major metropolitan areas. As a result, Milliken sounded
the death knell for meaningful school integration in most cities outside
the South.84
The Milliken decision reflected the Justices' profoundly different
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. Some members of the
Court advocated a formalist approach, which focused on the govern-
ment's use of racial classifications as the constitutional evil to be
avoided. Because the Constitution was colorblind, race-conscious reme-
dies were appropriate only when necessary to rectify past intentional
discrimination. Therefore, the de jure/de facto distinction was critically
important in evaluating the propriety of judicial relief. Meanwhile, other
Justices insisted that color-conscious remedies should be available to
address the persistence of racially identifiable schools and neighbor-
hoods, whatever their cause. These members of the Court understood the
equal protection guarantee as a sword against subordination and not sim-
ply a shield against state-sponsored discrimination. Accordingly, there
was no reason to draw a bright-line distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation."
The diversity rationale in the realm of higher education developed,
in part, as a response to this intractable controversy over the constitu-
tionality of race-conscious remedies in the absence of past discrimina-
tion. The early higher education cases, which laid the foundation for
Brown, were important in establishing a norm of non-discrimination, but
they did not result in substantial increases in minority student enroll-
ment.8 6 Instead, affirmative action had diversified college and university
student bodies, but the programs, which did not require proof of past
wrongdoing, rested uneasily with the Court's focus on an individual's
right to be free of discrimination. As a consequence, dissension among
83. Id. at 741-45; see also Orfield, supra note 73, at 11 ("Chief Justice Warren Burger cited
the 'deeply rooted tradition' of local control of public schools as the legal rationale for denying a
metropolitan remedy and allowing segregated schools to persist.").
84. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 222-25 (1979); Sheryll D.
Cashin, American Public Schools Fifty Years After Brown: A Separate and Unequal Reality, 47
How. L.J. 341, 346-47 (2004).
85. For an account of the clash between anticlassification and antisubordination
interpretations of the Constitution, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470
(2004).
86. See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 382-83 (2005).
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the Justices threatened to stymie the Court when it heard a challenge to
affirmative action in university admissions a few years after Milliken.
8 7
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the plaintiff, a
disappointed white applicant to the University of California at Davis
medical school, alleged that he had been a victim of "reverse discrimina-
tion" because seats in the entering class were set aside for minority
applicants with less competitive credentials than those of nonminority
applicants.88 Four Justices wanted to strike the Davis plan down because
it violated a strict principle of colorblindness, given that the medical
school had not engaged in past discrimination.89 Meanwhile, another
four wanted to uphold the program as a way to rectify general societal
discrimination and underrepresentation in the medical profession.9"
Justice Lewis Powell cast the deciding vote, and, in doing so, he
turned away from this polarizing debate to "find a middle ground."'" To
that end, he invoked a tradition of academic freedom that allowed col-
leges and universities to promote an "atmosphere which is most condu-
cive to speculation, experiment and creation."9 According to Powell,
institutions of higher education legitimately could value a diverse stu-
dent body as a way to enrich the discourse among peers on campus.9 3
Although Powell deferred to the judgment of higher education adminis-
trators in this regard, his deference was not without limits. He applied
strict scrutiny to the programs, demanding that they be narrowly tailored
to achieve the institution's compelling interest in diversity. Holistic
review that allowed all applicants to compete against each other, with
race as one factor among many, would pass muster. Quotas and set-
asides like those used by the Davis medical school would not.94
Powell had hoped to deflect the controversy surrounding affirma-
tive action, but his decision in Bakke remained the subject of intense
criticism and continuing legal challenges. 95 By the time of the Grutter
litigation, opponents of race-conscious admissions had begun to argue
87. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE 79-80 (1988).
88. 438 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Although Justice Powell became
identified as the pivotal vote, Justice Harry Blackmun's silence on Bakke became a source of deep
anxiety and delay and made him a central factor in the case behind the scenes. See SCHWARTZ,
supra note 87, at 120-30.
89. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).
90. See id. at 362-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
91. JEFFRIES, supra note 79, at 473.
92. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)).
93. Id. at 313-15.
94. See id. at 315-20.
95. See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at
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that Powell wrote only for himself and that his lonely opinion had little
precedential value.9 6 In persuading a majority of the Court to endorse
the diversity rationale, Justice O'Connor rehabilitated the First Amend-
ment framework that Powell had established in Bakke. Like Powell, she
applied strict scrutiny when evaluating the admissions program at the
University of Michigan Law School, but she allowed for some deference
to college and university officials based on academic freedom.97
That deference turned not only on the administrators' special exper-
tise in shaping the learning process but also on their role as trusted gate-
keepers to elite pathways to leadership. According to O'Connor, diverse
leadership was a key component of democratic legitimacy, a point
brought home by amicus briefs filed on behalf of business leaders and a
group of retired military generals.98 With O'Connor's interpretive gloss,
diversity now had dual purposes: the production of knowledge through
the exchange of ideas, as well as the legitimation of the democratic pro-
cess through openness and inclusion. Even after bolstering the analysis
of diversity as a compelling interest, however, O'Connor hewed closely
to Powell's requirement of narrow tailoring. Like him, she enforced a
distinction between holistic review, which was constitutional, and quo-
tas and set-asides, which were not.99
Bakke and Grutter clearly adopted a different logic than the deseg-
regation decisions. No longer was race defined as either a formal gov-
ernmental classification or a mark of stigma and subordination. Instead,
race became a proxy for perspectives and values that mattered in under-
standing the world and in forging a responsive political process."' ° In
other decisions, the Court had focused on equality as an individual enti-
tlement to be free of discrimination, but the higher education cases
explored the collective implications of race. Producing knowledge and
promoting democratic legitimacy required interaction among people
from different backgrounds. The shared interest in diversity could not be
protected by focusing exclusively on individual claims of right. Instead,
Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2253 (2000) (describing the increasing attacks on affirmative
action in higher education admissions beginning in the 1990s).
96. See Rachel F. Moran, The Heirs of Brown: The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger, in RACE
LAW STORIES 451, 463 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008).
97. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
98. Id. at 330-32. For a discussion of the role of the amici in the case, see Moran, supra note
96, at 485-90 and Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1462-66 (2005).
99. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-39; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-77 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. For a fuller account of how the desegregation and diversity cases diverge, see Rachel F.
Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2008).
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the make-up of the entire class had to be considered, and so institutions
became essential to cultivating the conditions necessary for the
exchange of ideas to flourish.
Despite these differences, the opinions in Parents Involved often
tended to conflate diversity and desegregation. This tendency undoubt-
edly had its roots in the school districts' own strategizing. Regardless of
Brown's rhetorical power, later desegregation decisions had made clear
that color-conscious remedies were designed to combat de jure discrimi-
nation. Because the Louisville and Seattle plans were voluntary, the dis-
tricts faced serious constitutional obstacles to classifying students on the
basis of race. Even if the boards' goals were benign, that is, to promote
diversity and to combat racial isolation, the plans were subject to strict
scrutiny. Only the diversity rationale in Bakke and Grutter had per-
suaded the Court to uphold the differential treatment of students absent a
history of past discrimination. So, the school boards in Louisville and
Seattle adopted the constitutional vocabulary of the affirmative action
cases, even if the inspiration for the plans was in all likelihood the
Brown decision.o0
Treating diversity and desegregation as a distinction without a dif-
ference had real costs for the Parents Involved litigation. Both concepts
became numbers-driven in ways that obscured their underlying ratio-
nales. Diversity was equated with promoting racial balance, while
desegregation was treated as a cure for racial imbalance. Because deseg-
regation was associated with an individual's right to be free of discrimi-
nation, even Justices sympathetic to the districts' plans focused on
measures like student achievement. The opinions ignored the collective
value of diversity that was at stake in Bakke and Grutter. With no unam-
biguous proof of academic benefits and no consideration of shared inter-
ests, Justice Kennedy could readily attack the efforts in Louisville and
Seattle as mere racial balancing, a set of "[c]rude measures"'' 0 2 that
treated students as "racial chits valued and traded according to one
school's supply and another's demand,"103 and the Roberts plurality
could insist that a commitment to racial proportionality had "no logical
stopping point.'
101. See John Aloysius Farrell, Op-Ed., Supreme Court Due To Decide if Race Still Matters in
U.S., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 4, 2006, § A, at 2 (describing the Louisville plan as a
legacy of Brown); Tom Brune, School Desegregation Back in Court, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 2006, at
Al8 (noting a Seattle School District attorney's statement recalling the "separate but not equal"
principle of Brown).
102. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 498 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
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III. DOES THE DISTINCTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE?: DISENTANGLING
DIVERSITY AND DESEGREGATION IN PARENTS INVOLVED
Had the Justices fully engaged the diversity rationale with its roots
in expressive freedom, the opinions in Parents Involved might have
looked different. Instead of a single-minded focus on equality and non-
discrimination, the Court would have had to address problems of free
speech and non-repression. In defining the hallmarks of a democratic
education, philosopher Amy Gutmann has identified two principled con-
straints on popular sovereignty. The first is non-repression, which "pre-
vents the state, and any group within it, from using education to restrict
rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the
good society." 115 This right "secures more than a freedom from interfer-
ence" and also includes "the freedom to deliberate rationally among dif-
fering ways of life," rather than "freedom to pursue the singularly
correct way of personal or political life.' ' 6 The goal of preventing com-
munities from stifling rational deliberation is entirely consistent with
diversity's objective of promoting a robust exchange of ideas.
The second principled limit is non-discrimination, which "extends
the logic of nonrepression" by requiring that "all educable children...
be educated."' 1 7 This principle bars the state from being "selectively
repressive by excluding entire groups of children from schooling or by
denying them an education conducive to deliberation among conceptions
of the good life and the good society."' °8 Educational exclusion can
have the effect of "repress[ing], at least temporarily, the capacity and
even the desire of these groups to participate in the processes that struc-
ture choice among good lives."' 0 9 Diversity's concern with promoting
democratic legitimacy comports with an inclusive participatory ethic.
Moreover, if racial concentration results in stigma that prevents minority
children from deliberating about the good life, this segregation violates a
principle of non-discrimination as well as one of non-repression.
Building on Gutmann's observations, here I will address two key
ways in which disentangling diversity and desegregation might have
made a difference in Parents Involved. First, I will discuss how a preoc-
cupation with racial balancing in the absence of past discrimination led
some Justices wrongly to invoke diversity as a constraint on voluntary
school desegregation. In particular, they assumed that the concept of
critical mass should apply to school districts in the same way that it does
105. AMY Gu-rMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 44 (1987).
106. Id.
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to colleges and universities. Because institutions of higher education
were concerned with preserving threshold representation so that students
of color could effectively voice their views, admissions programs did
not have to confront the problems of persistent racial concentration that
Louisville and Seattle were addressing.
Second, I will explain why a norm of non-repression of student
speech should apply in elementary and secondary schools, even if local
boards do not enjoy the same insularity from political pressures that jus-
tifies academic freedom and diversity in higher education. Protecting
freedom of expression safeguards rational deliberation and the identity-
building process that Justice Kennedy in particular associated with a
diverse student body. As I will show, insofar as the capacity to imagine
a range of personas is part and parcel of expressive freedom, the Court
should consider how well voluntary plans advance this value, particu-
larly when racial concentration threatens to rigidify racial differences.
A. How Diversity Wrongly Operated as a Constraint on Racial
Balancing in Parents Involved
In Parents Involved, a majority of the Court concluded that Louis-
ville and Seattle had a compelling interest in reducing racial concentra-
tion. Concerns about concentration derive from Brown's assertion that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."' 110 This conclu-
sion rests on the belief that segregation inevitably produces the intangi-
ble injury of a stigmatized racial identity.111 Even if staff, facilities,
curriculum, and extracurricular activities are equalized, the message of
inferiority communicated by deliberate segregation persists." 2 In later
decisions, the Court has taken the position that stigma-at least of the
unconstitutional variety-resides in the use of official racial classifica-
tions rather than in the lived reality of racially identifiable schools.' 13
The de jure/de facto distinction therefore has played a crucial role in
identifying which segregated schools are inherently unequal and hence
unconstitutional. Only de jure segregation prompts remedial intervention
by the Court, including measures that promote racial balance.
When a majority of the Court in Parents Involved recognized that
reducing racial concentration is a compelling interest, the holding sub-
110. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
11I. See id. at 493-94. This is a conclusion that Justice Clarence Thomas vigorously rejects.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2777
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting "black achievement in 'racially isolated' environments").
112. See KLUGER, supra note 62, at 704-07.
113. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79




verted any assertion that only de jure segregation merits constitutional
concern under a colorblind Constitution. Mitigating racial isolation was
compelling precisely because the Justices understood the segregation in
Louisville and Seattle as presumptively harmful, regardless of its
causes.114 As a result, the Justices seemed to acknowledge-at least
implicitly-that the constitutional distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation is not so bright-line after all, at least with respect to
whether governmental officials can employ race-conscious remedies.
The dissent was prepared to ballast the de jure/de facto distinction alto-
gether, at least when school boards adopt voluntary desegregation plans.
According to Justice Breyer, the Court had placed limits only on the
equitable powers of federal courts to mandate relief, not on the adminis-
trative authority of school boards to adopt race-conscious policies." 5
Justice Kennedy, however, was not willing to go this far. Even though
race-conscious student assignments seemed to be the logical antidote to
racial isolation, he insisted that they were rarely, if ever, likely to pass
constitutional muster. The fact that racial concentration was destructive
did not make racial balancing-defined as strict rules of proportional-
ity-desirable." 6
At this point, diversity became a useful device to deal with a consti-
tutional conundrum: The cure for serious racial imbalance was not racial
balancing. Kennedy, joined by the Roberts plurality, pointed out that
under Bakke and Grutter, colleges and universities at most could seek a
critical mass of underrepresented students, the level of representation
necessary to make meaningful the exchange of ideas and access to lead-
ership. 17 Because Louisville and Seattle had pursued proportionality,
the diversity rationale could not justify the mechanics of their plans. As
Roberts explained, the University of Michigan Law School "did not
count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the 'meaningful number'
it regarded as necessary to diversify its student body. Here, the racial
balance the districts seek is a defined range set solely by reference to the
demographics of the respective school districts."" 8 For that reason, even
assuming that Grutter applied to the voluntary plans, they still were
unconstitutional because "[t]his working backward to achieve a particu-
lar type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some dem-
114. See John A. Powell, Op-Ed., Segregated Schools Ruling Not All Bad, NEWSDAY, July 16,
2007, at A33. Only Justice Thomas took issue with this view, arguing that concerns about racially
identifiable institutions were based on stereotypical assumptions about black inferiority. See
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2823-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
117. See id. at 2757 (plurality opinion); id. at 2793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
118. Id. at 2757 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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onstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is
a fatal flaw under [the Court's] existing precedent.""' 9
This analysis overlooked the distinction between promoting the
exchange of ideas on the one hand and counteracting the harms of
stigma on the other. The plurality, joined by Justice Kennedy, assumed
that a principle of critical mass should comparably constrain the school
districts' pursuit of both goals. Yet, in Grutter, Michigan officials had
concluded that a threshold number of students were necessary to ensure
that a range of perspectives would be represented on campus. Minority
students enrolled in token numbers might be unwilling to speak can-
didly, and, if they did, they might wrongly be identified as spokespeople
for their entire racial or ethnic group. 20 The concept of critical mass
therefore was closely linked to the free expression of ideas on a diverse
campus, one that was not constrained by entrenched patterns of
segregation.
Although tokenism in colleges and universities admittedly could
result in unwonted stereotyping and even stigma, the problem that Lou-
isville and Seattle faced was very different. Minority students were clus-
tered in racially isolated schools, which in turn led to educational harm.
As a result, the school districts needed to be concerned with the thresh-
old at which perceptions of isolation dissipate, not just the threshold at
which critical mass would be created. Given the demographics in these
two cities, voluntary plans that pursued only a critical mass of minority
students would lead to diversity in some schools, but necessarily leave
others identifiable by race. Pupils assigned to schools that remained seg-
regated could suffer from a heightened sense of isolation when compar-
ing their experience to that of select peers in diverse classrooms. If so, a
mechanical invocation of critical mass might put the objective of pro-
moting diversity at loggerheads with the goal of reducing racial concen-
tration.'21 In short, there was no basis to assume that these two rationales
would work in tandem, so there was no reason to presume that all of the
remedial constraints in Grutter would apply with the same force to the
Louisville and Seattle plans.
B. How Diversity Might Have Operated as a Constraint on
Racial Imbalance in Parents Involved
Because the Justices did not carefully distinguish between diversity
and desegregation, their opinions ignored the ways in which diversity
119. Id.
120. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-20 (2003).
121. See GurMANN, supra note 105, at 162 (noting that "perfect proportionality" is
unnecessary but that racial isolation violates "the democratic standard of nonexclusion").
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actually might operate as a constraint on the perpetuation of racial
imbalance in public schools. The Court's incomplete treatment of the
diversity rationale in part reflects the fact that it is something of a consti-
tutional anomaly and therefore incompletely theorized. Here, I first will
explore why Bakke and Grutter do not fit neatly into either equal protec-
tion or First Amendment jurisprudence. Then, I will demonstrate how a
fuller understanding of the diversity rationale might alter the analysis of
voluntary desegregation plans in Parents Involved. In particular, I will
show how a concern with a principle of non-repression can inform the
meaning of non-discrimination. A focus on preserving students' capaci-
ties to imagine different versions of the good life can explain why choice
plans bolster the case for deferring to school board decision-making. In
addition, recognizing an interest in freedom of expression can reveal the
limits of an unduly narrow preoccupation with the harms of formal
racial classifications.
With respect to equality jurisprudence, the Justices have been split
between those who embrace a formal norm of colorblindness and those
who endorse color-conscious remedies to counter subordination and
stratification. 22 Because the academic freedom justification in Bakke
and Grutter differs so markedly from this preoccupation with anticlas-
sification and antisubordination interpretations of the Constitution,
diversity arguments generally have not saved affirmative action pro-
grams outside of colleges and universities. For example, the Court has
rejected arguments that government set-aside programs in employment
or contracting implicate First Amendment concerns about freedom of
expression and the exchange of ideas. 23
Diversity also has not been fully elaborated in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. Though justified on academic freedom
grounds, Bakke and Grutter have had a negligible impact on free speech
122. Siegel, supra note 85, at 1534-44.
123. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to a Small Business Administration program that created a financial incentive for
contractors if they employed minority sub-contractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (invalidating a city council's set-aside program for minority contractors
doing business with the city). In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the Court briefly recognized
diversity as a justification for a program that gave a plus to racial and ethnic minorities in the
award of broadcasting licenses. 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S.
200. However, the decision did not survive. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27 (claiming that
Metro Broadcasting used an intermediate standard of review rather than strict scrutiny and
therefore overturning Metro Broadcasting). Despite these setbacks, scholars continue to argue that
the diversity rationale is applicable elsewhere, most notably in the workplace. See, e.g., Cynthia L.
Estlund, Putting Grutter To Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the
Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 38-39 (2005); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the
Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 200, 232-37
(2004).
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cases in colleges and universities. Most lawsuits deal with professors'
and students' claims that they were subject to impermissible censorship
or retaliation when a college or university disapproved of their view-
points. According to Professor Paul Horwitz, the Justices prefer to
resolve these cases by relying on neutral principles that protect individ-
ual rights to freedom of expression. 124 So, administrators can require a
professor to teach a particular subject, but they cannot dictate a pedagog-
ical approach. 25 Students, too, enjoy protection from suspension, expul-
sion, or other sanctions based on the expression of unpopular
positions. 126
Bakke and Grutter are anomalous because courts have not paid
much attention to the conditions that shape individual choices about
speech. For instance, courts have not been receptive to efforts to regulate
speech based on a desire to improve a campus's racial climate. Judges
generally have rejected "hate speech" codes adopted to protect students
from "words that wound" because these measures chill the legitimate
discussion of racial difference and curtail individual rights of expres-
sion. 27 With an emphasis on the personal right to be free of censorship
and repression, First Amendment jurisprudence has shown little regard
for "the real-world context in which many speech acts take place" and
124. See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 471 (2005) ("The
Court repeatedly has sought to use generally applicable principles, such as neutrality and equality,
as its guiding principles in First Amendment jurisprudence. . . . Grutter's First Amendment
approach thus stands out as a rare ... exception to the Court's generally institution-indifferent
approach.").
125. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result) (describing "four essential freedoms" in the academy, including "what may be
taught" and "how it shall be taught"); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
("[T]he First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.").
126. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185-88 (1972).
127. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cit. 2001); Dambrot
v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852, 863-64 (E.D. Mich. 1989). But see Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 883 F. Supp.
1407, 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing regulation of a professor's classroom speech under a
sexual-harassment policy). For a sense of the academic debate on this subject, see, for example,
Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to
Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Richard Delgado & David
H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate
Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence Ifl, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); David
F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive
Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825 (1991); and Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991). For a seminal piece that played a key role in
framing the debate, see Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
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"the importance of the institutions in which so much First Amendment
activity-worship, study, debate, reporting-occurs." '28
Bakke and Grutter are notable exceptions because both explicitly
recognize that institutional settings, as well as acts of censorship or retal-
iation, can have a powerful impact on the expression of ideas. 29 The
recognition that structural conditions shape speech is by no means new.
In Bakke, Justice Powell drew on a concept of academic freedom that
was first developed in public universities in Germany and then trans-
planted to the United States in the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
Autonomy for institutions of higher education was designed to allow the
pursuit of knowledge without burdensome state interference. 3 ° To that
end, university administrators were granted substantial discretion as a
way to insulate themselves from outside political pressures to
conform. 131
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
diversity rationale did not apply outside of higher education. Although
he did not offer much in the way of an explanation, there certainly are
important differences between colleges and universities, on the one
hand, and elementary and secondary schools, on the other. Popularly
elected boards typically oversee the operation of local school districts.
Even though board elections are generally non-partisan, members are
directly accountable to a popular constituency. 32 With this electoral
structure, it is hard to argue that school officials are or should be insu-
lated from external political pressures except to the extent that partisan-
ship leads to factionalization. Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, Justice
Breyer justified autonomy for school boards on other grounds. He con-
tended that the Louisville and Seattle plans were part of "a democratic
political system through which the people themselves must together find
128. Horwitz, supra note 124, at 471.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 474; see also Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1265, 1269-71 (1988) (discussing German
academic freedom).
131. Horwitz, supra note 124, at 475.
132. Questions related to the politics of local school boards and how they affect accountability
are complex. The nonpartisan quality and off-cycle scheduling of school board elections can lead
to notoriously low voter turnouts. See Ann Allen & David N. Plank, School Board Election
Structure and Democratic Representation, 19 EDUc. POL'Y 510, 511-12 (2005) ("In many school
board elections, 5% or fewer of voters cast ballots .... "). Moreover, school boards now face
significant challenges to their authority from city councils, state boards, and legislatures, as well
as the courts. See id. at 510. See generally BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF
EDUCATION POLIcs (William G. Howell ed., 2005) (discussing the lack of true autonomy of
local schools). Although the Court's account of school board politics may have been unduly
formalistic or romanticized, that complicated issue lies beyond the scope of this article.
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answers"' 3 3 to pressing racial problems. According to Breyer, the Con-
stitution allowed "the people, acting through their elected representa-
tives, freedom to select the use of 'race-conscious' criteria from among
their available options."' 3 4 In short, his defense of school board auton-
omy drew much more on respect for a federalist system than on regard
for academic freedom.
There certainly are precedents for Breyer's endorsement of school
board autonomy. Ironically, one of the strongest came in the very case
that effectively halted court-ordered desegregation outside the South,
Milliken v. Bradley.'35 In overturning an inter-district desegregation
remedy, the Court emphasized that suburban boards had not been found
guilty of any misconduct that led to the segregated conditions in core
city schools.' 3 6 In a federalist system of government, the Justices rea-
soned, the district court had to acknowledge limits on its equitable pow-
ers and could not simply "deprive the people of control of schools
through their elected representatives."' 37
Breyer's reliance on federalism, rather than academic freedom, to
justify school board autonomy poses distinct challenges for the analysis
in Parents Involved. The Court recognized that the districts could use
race-conscious remedies to promote diversity and reduce racial concen-
tration. However, if boards are merely political actors, it is unclear why
they should be trusted to make decisions about race when other officials
are not. Brown highlighted the risks of political overreaching when a
white majority subjugated blacks by enforcing Jim Crow segregation. In
later cases, the Justices recognized that race could be an insidious influ-
ence, whatever the identity of the majority and minority. In City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court expressed alarm at the specter of
"simple racial politics" when a city council dominated by African Amer-
133. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2833 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2834. Breyer has expressed these views regarding the benefits of local government
elsewhere, although he has questioned some of the Court's federalism decisions as misguided. See
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 56-65
(2005).
135. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Another powerful endorsement of local control came in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the Court rejected an equal protection challenge
to a property tax system that led to severe disparities in per-capita student expenditures. 411 U.S.
1, 56-59 (1973). In finding that the system was constitutional, Rodriguez held that there was no
fundamental right to an equal educational opportunity. See id. at 35. Together, Milliken and
Rodriguez might suggest that liberty interests typically thwart equality claims. However, Bakke
and Grutter show how liberty and equality can work in tandem to establish principles of
institutional access and participation.
136. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
137. Id. at 744.
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icans set aside municipal contracts for minority-owned companies. 138 As
Justice O'Connor explained:
In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the population of
the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are
held by blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily
act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assump-
tions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the
application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case.139
Although the city council was predominantly black and the disen-
franchised minority was white, the Court nonetheless applied strict scru-
tiny and struck the plan down.
According to the Court, the Richmond plan was fatally flawed
because "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination
in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to deter-
mine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."'14 The under-
representation of minority firms, standing alone, was insufficient to
justify a remedial plan because the city council made no attempt to
determine how many qualified minority businesses were available and
instead relied on "the unsupported assumption that white prime contrac-
tors simply will not hire minority firms."'' By insisting on a thoroughly
documented, factual record to support affirmative action when a
predominantly black city council dispreferred white contractors, Croson
made clear that all governmental racial classifications are inherently sus-
pect, regardless of who is disadvantaged. 4 '
Based on this deep distaste for racial politics, the Court has struck
down affirmative action programs in public employment and govern-
ment contracting.'43 Moreover, a justification based on diversity has not
made significant in-roads in defending these programs." 44 In that sense,
Parents Involved is something of a breakthrough because a majority of
the Court recognized diversity as a compelling reason for school boards
to make race-based decisions, even though the plans were not designed
to remedy past discrimination. The Roberts plurality saw the voluntary
138. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). For a fuller account of the story behind this
case, see Reginald Oh & Thomas Ross, Judicial Opinions as Racial Narratives: The Story of
Richmond v. Croson, in RACE LAW STORIES, supra note 96, at 381.
139. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 498 (majority opinion).
141. Id. at 502.
142. See id. at 494 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.").
143. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39 (1995); Croson, 488
U.S. at 508; Wygant v. Jackson Rd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.).
144. The Court seemed to endorse a diversity rationale for affirmative action in the award of
broadcasting licenses, but this opinion proved to be short-lived. See supra note 123.
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plans as fungible with impermissible set-asides, but the rest of the Jus-
tices disagreed. They were convinced that the Louisville and Seattle
plans did not amount to a politicized competition for scarce resources
because access to public education was guaranteed for all children. As
Justice Breyer explained, the school districts did not use race "to decide
who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the
basis of merit and which are in short supply."' 45 As a result, there was
little risk that diversity would operate to mask the harsh realities of pork-
barrel racial politics.
Though willing to acknowledge diversity as a compelling interest,
the majority in Parents Involved had no ready model for a constitution-
ally acceptable politics of race at the municipal level, in part because
Croson had so soundly rejected the notion that any such politics was
possible. Standing alone, Bakke and Grutter could not offer a completely
satisfying framework for the voluntary desegregation cases because pub-
lic colleges and universities had been characterized as cosmopolitan
organizations removed from politics in general and racial politics in par-
ticular. Diversity simply did not speak to the dangers of racial over-
reaching in local communities. To dispel concerns about potential
unfairness, Justice Breyer described how the voluntary plans displayed
an ongoing commitment to equity and choice for students of all races.
According to his dissenting opinion,
[T]he districts' plans reflect efforts to overcome a history of segrega-
tion, embody the results of broad experience and community consul-
tation, seek to expand student choice while reducing the need for
mandatory busing, and use race-conscious criteria in highly limited
ways that diminish the use of race compared to preceding integration
efforts. 1
46
His analysis suggested that a broadly inclusive decision-making process
coupled with expanded enrollment options for all students served as a
safeguard against an abusive political process.
Justice Kennedy shared Breyer's commitment to diversity and his
basic faith in the democratic process but parted ways on the propriety of
race-conscious student assignments. Brown and its progeny had
reflected concerns about officials' discriminatory motivations, but Ken-
nedy worried about the corrupting effects of racial categories on the
communities that Louisville and Seattle served. Even if the boards'
objectives were laudable, differential treatment of individuals on the
basis of race could generate a politics of "divisiveness" and a "corrosive





discourse." '147 Insofar as this danger inhered in the use of racial classifi-
cations, no amount of broad consultation or school choice could mitigate
the dangers. As a result, Kennedy was willing to allow the school boards
to "bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and
other concerned citizens" in fashioning race-conscious policies, but not
if they relied on "widespread governmental allocation of benefits and
burdens on the basis of racial classifications," barring an extraordinary
justification.' 48 For Kennedy, an inclusive process was not a sufficient
counterweight to the dangers of a poisoned public discourse. Instead, he
insisted that boards could be race-conscious, but only if their decisions
took the right form, for instance, when race played a part in drawing
attendance boundaries or selecting new school sites.
Although Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy reached disparate
conclusions about the dangers of simple racial politics, both Justices
focused exclusively on how to implement a principle of non-discrimina-
tion. For Breyer, racial classifications were a legitimate way to over-
come a history of subordination, while for Kennedy their use was yet
another transgression against a norm of equal treatment. What is missing
from either analysis is any clear sense of how diversity's unique goals of
fostering discourse and promoting democratic legitimacy might indepen-
dently bear on the use of race. To fill this gap, Breyer and Kennedy
would have had to look beyond equality concerns to questions of liberty:
the right to express ideas and develop an identity free of government
repression.
On other occasions, the Justices have drawn on college and univer-
sity precedents to find that protecting freedom of expression in junior
high and high schools leads to the "robust exchange of ideas which dis-
covers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.' "149 This classroom environment sounds
very much like the forum for peer-to-peer learning that Grutter envi-
sioned. In protecting public schools as a forum for speech, the Court has
focused on students' rights, rather than on institutional autonomy. The
Court has made clear that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"'
150
and that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism."'' Pupils who express unpopular views are protected unless they
create a "material and substantial interference with schoolwork or disci-
147. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148. Id.
149. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (alteration in
original) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
150. Id. at 506.
151. Id. at 511.
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pline.' "52 These decisions prevent indoctrination and permit students to
imagine a range of good lives. 53 Given the political realities of local
school governance, a jurisprudence of individual speech rights is proba-
bly a more realistic way to shield students from pressures to conform
than is an autonomy principle that insulates board decisions.
Despite the critical importance of protections for student speech,
there have been lapses that are sobering reminders of how difficult it can
be to promote free expression and democratic values in public school
classrooms. With respect to efforts to turn schools into a marketplace of
ideas, the Court in recent years has begun to prize conformity in the
name of civility. The Justices have accorded school officials increasing
discretion to censor speech that offends the sensibilities of the commu-
nity, even if there is no threat of material disruption to school opera-
tions.' 54 By granting this expanded authority to administrators, the
Justices cast students in the role of passive learners rather than active
participants in the instructional process.
With respect to promoting democratic legitimacy, public schools
play an integral role in the nation-building process, but, again, there
have been instances of overreaching, this time in the name of patriotism.
Although Grutter focused on elite pathways to leadership, local school
boards have a long tradition of preparing children for their civic respon-
sibilities. Indeed, Brown itself recognized this commitment:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even ser-
vice in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship.
155
At the elementary and secondary levels, democratic legitimacy resonates
with images of the "common school." '56 Ideally, the common school
should be a place where children come together to bridge their differ-
ences and forge a shared set of values, beliefs, and attitudes that ready
them for the workplace and civic life.' 57 At times, however, jingoistic
zeal has led boards to engage in harsh programs of "Americanization"
152. Id.
153. GUTMANN, supra note 105, at 122-23.
154. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
155. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
156. For a description of competing definitions of the "common school," see Aaron Jay Saiger,
School Choice and State's Duty To Support "Public" Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 930-39
(2007).
157. See generally Molly O'Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School,
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that sought to stamp out immigrant students' linguistic and cultural dif-
ferences as a test of loyalty. 58
Lapses like these do not invalidate the role that schools play in
socializing children for work and citizenship. Rather, these transgres-
sions are a reminder that politics can fail and that courts therefore must
remain alert to the perils of ideological repression, especially where dis-
advantaged and disenfranchised groups are concerned. These risks are
especially great because children in elementary and secondary schools
generally are a captive audience. Unlike college and university students,
pupils are compelled to attend school until a specified age.159 Even when
families are dissatisfied with their local school, they may find it difficult
to move to another district or pay tuition for a child to attend a private
institution. 160
This analysis reveals that local political processes create dangers of
ideological repression as well as of racial discrimination. Reframing the
problem of deference to school boards in this way casts some of the
Justices' concerns about voluntary desegregation plans in a different
light. First, those who endorsed diversity should look at whether the
plans created opportunities for students to imagine different versions of
the good life, particularly where race is concerned. For instance, Justice
Breyer could have invoked norms of non-repression as well as non-dis-
crimination in explaining why he preferred plans that enlarge student
choice. In his defense of local board autonomy, he noted that the volun-
tary plans systematically sought to enhance educational options as well
as to diminish segregation. If non-repression is a constitutional value in
its own right, then efforts to promote equality will be most deserving of
deference when they preserve individual freedom. In Louisville and
Seattle, the benefits of integration were coupled with choices among
several schools. As a result, all students had an expanded range of ways
to develop their skills and interests through specialized curricular offer-
ings, alternative teaching methodologies, and different extracurricular
activities. These possibilities likely would not have been available in a
single neighborhood school. Of course, choice alone can never provide
carte blanche to use race in a crude and stereotypical fashion, but the
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581 (2004) (describing the normative ideal of the common school and how
it emerged as a national philosophy that influenced state practice).
158. See DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at
16-17, 169-86 (1987).
159. See Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62,
64-66, 76-84 (2002).
160. Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY 13, 30 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer
eds., 1999).
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availability of educational options does serve as evidence that a local
board was not engaging in repressive politics, racial or otherwise. 161
In addition, a focus on problems of repression requires the Justices
who rejected race-conscious student assignments to explain why this
approach is consistent with preserving the capacity to imagine a range of
racial futures. Because Justice Kennedy explicitly recognized diversity
as part of an identity-building process, this is an especially pressing
challenge for him. In highlighting the dangers of "divisiveness" and "a
corrosive discourse," Justice Kennedy sought to preempt collective inci-
vility where race is concerned. His efforts to preserve a harmonious pub-
lic discourse necessarily limit the possibilities for robust exchange that
explores different versions of the racial good life. By allowing fears of a
hostile reception to preclude race-based classifications, Kennedy's
approach is reminiscent of the "heckler's veto." 162 Members of any race
who are sufficiently disgruntled and dissent loudly enough can block
voluntary desegregation plans like the ones in Louisville and Seattle.
Indeed, the mere prospect of dissension suffices because Kennedy pre-
sumed profound disruption without requiring any real evidence of it
other than the classification itself (and perhaps the lawsuits that were
filed). 163
Kennedy also assumes that other race-conscious measures will be
more palatable than race-based student assignments. 164 Again, he offers
161. Explicit recognition of norms of both non-discrimination and non-repression would have
strengthened Justice Breyer's efforts to rely on choice as evidence that the voluntary plans in
Louisville and Seattle were constitutional. He focused on increasing options for students as a way
to dispel anxieties about simple racial politics and school board discrimination. However,
expanding choice also should have been relevant in addressing Justice Kennedy's concerns about
the role of schools in identity building and the dangers of ideological repression and racial
reification. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
162. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 674-76 (1983)
(analogizing judicial efforts to circumscribe rights in discrimination and affirmative action cases
in response to popular resistance to a heckler's veto). I say "reminiscent" because by assigning
students under the voluntary desegregation plans, the boards engaged in conduct and not simply
speech. The analogy becomes more apt when the mere naming of race through the use of
governmental classifications triggers the concern. Then, a strong expression of dissenting views
chills speech. In this case, however, the speaker is the government, rather than a private individual
whose statements are censored or punished by officials to preserve the public peace. See, e.g.,
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 557-58 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2-6 (1949). At least some members of
the Court have recognized the danger of allowing a heckler's veto to chill governmental speech,
however. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574-75 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens & Kennedy, JJ.).
163. See GUTMANN, supra note 105, at 164-65 (noting unique role of public officials in
coordinating desegregation efforts and calming dissent in the process).
164. Here, Kennedy's approach resembles that of Powell and O'Connor. All were willing to
brook some race consciousness in governmental decision-making but insisted that it take the right
form. When Powell first distinguished between illicit quotas and permissible holistic review in
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no evidence to support this view. In fact, it seems quite unlikely that any
simple division between racial classifications and other race-conscious
remedies can fully capture the local politics of resistance to reform.
Some communities like Louisville and Seattle may be able to adopt and
implement race-based student assignment plans, while other cities would
find it difficult to weigh race in any way because of a popular demand
for complete colorblindness. Kennedy does not say whether dissatisfied
constituents could foreclose the consideration of race in drawing attend-
ance boundaries or selecting school sites if threatened protests would
poison the political process. At the end of the day, there might be no
efficacious way to pursue voluntary desegregation plans if they had to
survive a political litmus test based on preservation of civil discourse
and racial harmony.1 65 As a result, fear of racial dissent would impose
serious costs for those who want to consider meaningful school integra-
tion as part of a definition of the good life. This constraint in turn would
hamper the imaginative capacities of children of all races and arguably
produce a different kind of racial politics, a constriction of the multira-
cial futures that local communities can contemplate.
Finally, Kennedy's emphasis on narrow tailoring to avoid discrimi-
nation largely ignores the potential for repression that inheres in persis-
tent racial concentration. Should race-conscious student assignments
prove to be the only effective way to desegregate a school system, then
boards could be forced to acquiesce in the perpetuation of racial isola-
tion under Kennedy's approach. 166 Yet, if reducing concentration is a
compelling constitutional interest because of concerns about stigmatic
harms, then students in racially identifiable schools are not enjoying the
chance to explore a full range of good lives. The ability of children to
imagine their racial futures is crippled by this isolation. Entrenched seg-
regation therefore can reify race in ways more lasting and insidious than
any race-conscious student assignment plan would.
As this analysis shows, Parents Involved missed the opportunity to
Bakke, critics (including some of his own law clerks) thought that there was no constitutional
basis for treating the approaches differently. JEFFRIES, supra note 79, at 476-77, 484-85. Powell,
however, thought that a plus for race would be politically acceptable, while a quota would not. Id.
Immediately after the Bakke decision, his compromise seemed to succeed in quelling the
controversy. Id. However, the attacks that continue to undercut affirmative action in college and
university admissions suggest that his political instincts were only partly right.
165. See Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 939 (2008) (noting that
Kennedy's proposed alternatives to race-conscious student assignment plans could still trigger
constitutional challenges if disgruntled groups were disproportionately affected).
166. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan Eaton, From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville: Is
"All Deliberate Speed" Stuck in Reverse?, 30 U. ARK. Lrr'rLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 290-91 (2008)
(noting that a number of school districts have abandoned voluntary desegregation plans after
Parents Involved in part out of concerns about litigation).
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grapple with the interplay of the principle of equality augured by Brown
and the interest in academic freedom acknowledged in Bakke and Grut-
ter. As a result, the Court did not fully appreciate all of the interests at
stake in voluntary desegregation plans, nor did the Justices thoroughly
address the complexity of fashioning remedies that simultaneously stim-
ulate the exchange of ideas, promote democratic legitimacy, and combat
the stigma of racial isolation. Had the distinction between diversity and
desegregation been fully explored, the Court need not have found itself
once again embroiled in debates over the anticlassification and
antisubordination Constitution. Instead, the Parents Involved case could
have clarified why the use of race is sometimes appropriate not only to
remedy past discrimination but also to structure environments in which
students can imagine a range of racial identities.
CONCLUSION
Parents Involved was a breakthrough insofar as a majority of the
Court recognized that the diversity rationale could apply outside the
realm of higher education. Unfortunately, because the Justices conflated
diversity and desegregation, the promise of this breakthrough was not
fully realized. The opinions focused almost entirely on the battle over
the meaning of non-discrimination that has come to be associated with
Brown's legacy. There was very little analysis of the norm of non-
repression that underpins the principle of academic freedom in Bakke
and Grutter. As a result, a majority of the Court reverted to a narrow
preoccupation with the discriminatory dangers of racial classifications
and failed to appreciate the expressive possibilities of more flexible
approaches to race. The cost of this incomplete vision may be a dimin-
ished capacity to build our collective racial futures.
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